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Abstract
This paper analyzes price competition in a duopoly market in which products are both
horizontally and vertically differentiated. Firms offer a basic and a premium product
to buyers, some of whom are brand loyal. We establish the existence of a unique and
symmetric Nash pricing equilibrium. Equilibrium prices are increasing in the degree of
horizontal differentiation and the amount of brand loyal customers. The equilibrium
price of the basic (premium) good is decreasing (increasing) in the quality difference and
profits can increase in costs when this difference is high enough. If the pricing decision is
taken at the product (division) level, then there is again a unique (and symmetric) Nash
equilibrium. Equilibrium prices and profits are lower than in the centralized case and
demand for the basic product is higher when the quality difference is sufficiently large.
Welfare is unambiguously lower with decentralized pricing.
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1 Introduction
There are many industries that consist of a few firms competing in multiple market segments
identified by product quality. Car companies like General Motors and Toyota supply both
basic and luxury cars, for example. Similarly, large electronic concerns such as Samsung
and Huawei sell standard as well as premium smartphones. The same holds for producers of
sunglasses, whiteware, surf gear, pharmaceuticals, air transport services, cleaning products,
plastics, coffee machines, cat litters, et cetera. As reported in Nocke and Schutz (2018),
multiproduct firms account for 91% of total output and 41% of the number of firms with
an average four-firm concentration ratio of 35% when measured at the NAICS 5-digit level.
Since there are demand linkages between the various quality-segments, a price change in one
particular segment often affects overall sales and profit patterns. Moreover, the higher-quality
segments are typically characterized by higher prices.
To illustrate, in the period mid 2017 until mid 2018, U.S. citizens spent over $5 billion
on dry dog food.1 The table below lists the four leading dry dog food brands in dollar sales
in the period mid 2017 until mid 2018.2 These four brands are produced by the two major
players in the dog food market: Nestle´ (39% market share) and Mars (24% market share).
The last column of the table presents the price per pound at Walmart for a large-sized bag.3
Both manufacturers have a low price and a high price brand among the four leading ones.
rank brand dollar sales manufacturer $/lb
1 Pedigree 603 mln Mars, Inc. 0.52
2 Purina Dog Chow 457 mln Nestle´ Purina Petcare Co. 0.45
3 Purina One Smartblend 346 mln Nestle´ Purina Petcare Co. 1.08
4 Iams Proactive Health 265 mln Mars, Inc. 1.08
A critical feature of such quality-segmented markets is that competition has both a hori-
zontal and a vertical dimension. For instance, if a firm raises the price of its premium product,
then it is likely to ‘lose’ customers to rivalling brands as well as to its own lower quality goods.
Likewise, if a firm cuts its premium product price, then ceteris paribus it steals customers
from comparable quality competitors while cannibalizing the sales of its other items. The
fact that such multi-product type firms are partly in competition with themselves makes the
design of an optimal pricing policy far from trivial.
The purpose of this paper is to study strategic pricing by sellers who are competing “head-
to-head” in several quality segments simultaneously. Towards that end, we analyze a price-
setting duopoly model of vertizontal product differentiation in which firms offer both a basic
and a premium product. Demand for these product types comes from two different sorts of
1Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/253976/pet-food-industry-expenditure-in-the-us/.
2Source: https://www.petfoodprocessing.net/articles/12825-state-of-the-us-pet-food-and-treat-industry.
3Information retrieved on 20 May 2019.
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customers; those who are brand oriented and those who are quality oriented. Brand oriented
buyers only choose between the basic and premium product of their preferred supplier. By
contrast, quality oriented buyers have a strict preference for a particular quality level and
choose between brands only.4
Within this framework, we establish the existence of a unique (and symmetric) Nash
pricing equilibrium and perform a series of comparative statics exercises on this equilibrium
outcome. With regard to the ‘horizontal forces’, we find that equilibrium prices are increasing
in the degree of brand differentiation and decreasing in the number of quality oriented buyers.
Regarding the ‘vertical forces’, we establish that equilibrium prices are increasing in the
amount of brand oriented buyers and show that the price of the basic (premium) product is
decreasing (increasing) in the quality difference. We furthermore find that equilibrium profits
can increase in the production costs of the standard good provided that the difference in
quality is sufficiently large.
We also consider the possibility of prices being determined at a more decentralized level. If
the pricing decision is taken at the product (division) level, then there is again a unique (and
symmetric) Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome is such that both prices and profits
are lower than in the centralized case. We furthermore find that the demand for the basic
good increases when the difference in quality is sufficiently large and show that decentralized
pricing unambiguously implies a welfare loss.
This research is related to the growing literature on strategic firm behavior in multi-
product oligopolies. Nocke and Schutz (2018) provides a framework to study multi-product
pricing when these goods are horizontally differentiated. With regards to quality differen-
tiation, Champsaur and Rochet (1989) examines what range of qualities profit-maximizing
duopolists prefer to offer. More recently, Johnson and Myatt (2003, 2006, 2015) also study
competition among firms selling multiple quality-differentiated products to address questions
related to pricing, entry and product-line configurations. Perhaps closest to our work is
Gilbert and Matutes (1993), which analyzes strategic product line choices by multi-product
firms supplying vertizontally differentiated goods.
There are only a few other articles that consider vertizontal product differentiation.
Within the context of international trade, Di Comite, Thisse and Vandenbussche (2014) intro-
duces a quadratic representative consumer model with vertizontal preferences to empirically
assess firm performance in export markets. Building on Neven and Thisse (1990), Ribeiro
(2015) studies price competition between two platforms (e.g., media outlets, clubs) that are
vertizontally differentiated. Finally, Li and Peeters (2017) uses a vertizontal differentiation
setting to examine strategic quality information disclosure. All these works do not consider
multi-product competition, however.
A separate strand of literature considers pricing strategies of firms meeting in more than
4At the firm level, therefore, brand oriented buyers are ‘captive’ and quality oriented buyers are ‘non-
captive’. See, for instance, Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and Sonderegger (2011).
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one market. Bernheim and Whinston (1990), for instance, has shown that such multi-market
contact may facilitate collusion. There are quite some industry studies providing empirical
evidence of higher prices when firms interact in more than one market, including cement (Jans
and Rosenbaum, 1998), hotels (Fernandez and Marin, 1998), telecommunications (Parker and
Roller, 1997; Busse, 2000), radio (Waldfogel and Wulf, 2006) and airlines (Evans and Kessides,
1994; Ciliberto and Williams, 2014). Choi and Gerlach (2013) explores multi-market contact
in relation to explicit collusion and antitrust enforcement. This study takes account of various
degrees of horizontal product differentiation, but does not consider the potential impact of
quality heterogeneity.
The next section introduces the model. This model is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4
considers the possibility of decentralized pricing and offers a welfare comparison. Section 5
concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 A Duopoly Model of Vertizontal Differentiation
Consider a simultaneous-move price-setting duopoly with a low (basic) and a high (premium)
quality market segment. In the spirit of Hotelling (1929), let both these submarkets be
represented by a unit interval. Quality is homogeneous within each segment and indicated by
the quality indices β > 0 and β + δ > 0 for the basic and the premium product, respectively.
The additional quality of the premium product is therefore given by δ > 0. Products are
positioned at the extremes of their respective segment and, without loss of generality, we
assume that firm 1 is located at ‘0’ and firm 2 is located at ‘1’. Firms’ cost structures are
identical and the low and the high quality varieties are respectively produced at constant
marginal costs c` and ch, with ch > c` ≥ 0. It is further assumed that δ > ch − c`, i.e., the
difference in product quality exceeds the additional costs of producing the premium product.
The demand side comprises two types of consumers that purchase no more than one
product. There is a mass of 2µ > 0 buyers who are brand oriented and equally divided
among both firms. These customers choose between buying a low and a high quality item
from a particular brand (i.e., firm 1 or firm 2). They are characterized by a taste parameter
y, which is uniformly distributed on an interval [0, 1] and which reflects the willingness to
pay for extra quality. Thus, a consumer at the lower bound does not derive utility from more
quality, whereas it is maximally valued at the upper extreme.
The remaining consumers are quality oriented, meaning they have a strict preference for a
given quality and only choose between buying from firm 1 or firm 2 (or do not buy). Both the
basic and the premium quality oriented buyers are uniformly distributed on an interval [0, 1]
with mass µ` > 0 and µh > 0, respectively. Moreover, a customer ‘located’ at xj experiences
a disutility of τj ·xj when buying from firm 1 and τj · (1−xj) when buying from firm 2, where
τj > 0 for j = `, h.
5
5Like in Altomonte, Colantone and Pennings (2016), this model therefore allows for asymmetric horizontal
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Let us now derive demand for each product type under the assumption that all consumers
purchase a product, which effectively requires a sufficiently high value of the parameter β.
Consider a brand i oriented buyer ‘located’ at yi. This consumer is indifferent between buying
the low quality and buying the high quality variety when:
β + δyi − pih = β − pi` ⇐⇒ yi = pih−pi`δ ,
where pih and pi` are the prices of firm i’s high and low quality product, respectively. Likewise,
a quality oriented customer ‘located’ at xj in the segment j = `, h is indifferent between buying
from firm 1 and buying from firm 2 when:
p1j + τjxj = p2j + τj(1− xj) ⇐⇒ xj = p2j−p1j+τj2τj .
Taken together, this gives the following demand for the firms’ high and low quality product:
d1h = µ · (1− ŷ1) + µh · x̂h d2h = µ · (1− ŷ2) + µh · (1− x̂h)
d1` = µ · ŷ1 + µ` · x̂` d2` = µ · ŷ2 + µ` · (1− x̂`),
where ŷi ≡ max
{
min
{pih−pi`
δ , 1
}
, 0
}
, i = 1, 2 and x̂j ≡ max
{
min
{p2j−p1j+τj
2τj
, 1
}
, 0
}
, j =
h, `.
In the ensuing analysis, our focus is on situations where each product type is sold to both
brand and quality oriented buyers. The following assumption gives sufficient conditions for
this.
Assumption 1. −(ch − c`) < τh − τ` < δ − (ch − c`).
Assumption 1 effectively provides an upper bound on the difference between τh and τ`. Finally,
we suppose that consumer preferences and costs are common knowledge.
3 Equilibrium Pricing and Analysis
In this section, we explore the nature of price competition between the two firms. Using the
above demand specification and assuming profit maximization, firm 1 picks prices p1` and p1h
to maximize
pi1(p1`, p1h, p2`, p2h) = (p1` − c`) · d1` + (p1h − ch) · d1h
= (p1` − c`) ·
(
µ · (p1h−p1`δ ) + µ` · (p2`−p1`+τ`2τ` )
)
+(p1h − ch) ·
(
µ · (1− p1h−p1`δ ) + µh · (p2h−p1h+τh2τh )
)
while simultaneously firm 2 sets prices p2` and p2h to maximize
pi2(p1`, p1h, p2`, p2h) = (p2` − c`) · d2` + (p2h − ch) · d2h
= (p2` − c`) ·
(
µ · (p2h−p2`δ ) + µ` · (1− p2`−p1`+τ`2τ` )
)
+(p2h − ch) ·
(
µ · (1− p2h−p2`δ ) + µh · (1− p2h−p1h+τh2τh )
)
.
product differentiation across market segments.
5
The next result shows that there is a unique Nash equilibrium and that this equilibrium is
symmetric. Moreover, in equilibrium, the price of the premium product exceeds that of the
basic product.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, there is a unique Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
firms set prices symmetrically at:
p∗` = c` + τ` +
2τ`µ
4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh
[(ch − c`)µh + 2(τh − τ`)µh + 4τhµ]
and
p∗h = ch + τh +
2τhµ
4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh
[δµ` − (ch − c`)µ` − 2(τh − τ`)µ` + 4τ`µ].
Furthermore, 0 < p∗h − p∗` < δ.6
The way in which equilibrium prices are presented here is reminiscent of the equilibrium
outcome in a standard version of Hotelling’s model of horizontal product differentiation, i.e.,
p∗j = cj + τj , j = `, h. In fact, notice that both prices coincide when the number of brand
oriented buyers becomes negligible (i.e., µ ↓ 0).
Even though one might a priori expect firms to set higher prices in the presence of brand
oriented buyers, Proposition 1 reveals that vertizontal equilibrium prices may be lower than
those in the corresponding horizontal version. The price of the basic product is, for example,
lower when there is severe price competition in the premium segment (τh ↓ 0) and relatively
low competitive pressure in the other submarket (τ` ↑ ch − c`). Likewise, the premium
price is lower when there is strong price competition in the standard-quality product market
(τ` ↓ 0) and relatively low competitive pressure in the premium segment (τh ↑ δ − (ch − c`)).
Intense price competition in one segment may therefore put a downward pressure on prices
in the adjacent segment and this ‘negative vertical price effect’ can dominate the ‘positive
horizontal price effect’. In other words, the presence of brand oriented buyers can lead to
more competitive prices in the segment where price competition is less severe.
We now proceed by studying comparative statics of the equilibrium prices. The next
proposition shows that prices are increasing in unit production costs.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium prices p∗` and p
∗
h are increasing in the
unit production costs c` and ch.
A firm’s basic and premium price are naturally increasing in the own production costs. De-
mand for the adjacent quality then rises with a subsequent price increase in that segment. It
can, moreover, be shown that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect so that an increase
in ch ceteris paribus boosts low quality product sales. An increase in c` likewise leads to a
rising premium product market share, all else equal.
The impact on prices of a change in quality difference (δ), horizontal competitive pressure
(τ` and τh) and the number of brand and quality oriented buyers (µ, µ` and µh) is less clear.
To explore this in more detail, we impose the following condition:
6It can be easily verified that ch > c` implies p
∗
` ≥ c` and δ > ch − c` implies p∗h ≥ ch.
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Assumption 2. − ch−c`2 < τh − τ` < δ−(ch−c`)2 .
This assumption is directly comparable to Assumption 1 and restricts the range within which
the horizontal differentiation parameters are allowed to vary.
Let us start by exploring the effect of changes in the horizontal dimension of the model.
The following result gives the price impact of changes in the horizontal differentiation param-
eters and the number of low and high quality oriented consumers.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 2, the equilibrium prices p∗` and p
∗
h are increasing in the
horizontal differentiation parameters τ` and τh and decreasing in the number of low and high
quality oriented buyers µ` and µh.
An increase in the horizontal differentiation parameter τj , j = `, h, leads ceteris paribus to an
increase of prices in segment j. This, in turn, generates more demand in the other segment
with a subsequent price increase. Regarding the number of quality oriented buyers, more
customers in, say, the premium segment intensifies competition in that part of the market
with lower premium prices resulting. More brand oriented buyers are therefore willing to
switch to the high quality product, which in turn makes it less costly to cut prices in the
lower segment. As before, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect so that an increase in
the number of high (low) quality oriented buyers results in more high (low) quality product
sales.
Next, let us turn to the vertical sphere. The next result shows how the equilibrium prices
are affected by changes in the number of brand oriented customers and the quality difference.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 2, the equilibrium prices p∗` and p
∗
h are increasing in the
number of brand oriented consumers µ. Furthermore, p∗` is decreasing and p
∗
h is increasing in
the quality difference δ.
A growing number of brand oriented buyers naturally enhances the incentive to exploit their
loyalty through raising prices. The price effect of a change in quality difference is more subtle.
As one would expect, an immediate impact of an increase in δ is that more buyers prefer the
high quality product. The resulting premium price rise does not fully offset this effect, which
is partly due to the presence of competition in the high quality segment. The subsequent loss
in brand oriented consumers buying the basic product makes it less costly to cut the basic
good price and steal some business in the low quality segment. Overall, however, premium
product sales are increasing in the quality difference.
Let us finally turn to equilibrium profits. Profits are not trivial to analyze within the
current framework, which is particularly due to the richness in parameters describing the de-
mand side. By imposing symmetry across submarkets, however, we can establish the following
supply side effect.
Proposition 5. Assume µh = µ` and τh = τ`. Equilibrium profits pi
∗
1 and pi
∗
2 are increasing
in c` and decreasing in ch if and only if δ > 2(ch − c`).
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This result reveals that equilibrium profits can decrease, but may also increase in unit pro-
duction costs. If the quality difference between the basic and premium product is sufficiently
large, then profits are decreasing in ch and increasing in c`. The reason is as follows. If δ
is high, then a large part of the brand oriented buyers opts for the premium product (i.e.,
ŷ∗i =
p∗ih−p∗i`
δ is relatively low). The reduced price-cost margin p
∗
ih−ch would therefore result in
relatively large losses. This negative direct effect is only partly offset by the positive indirect
effect, i.e., the rise in the price of the basic good. The latter effect is smaller since only a
modest part of the brand oriented buyers prefers the low quality product when the quality
difference is high.
In a similar fashion, equilibrium profits increase in c`. The direct effect is again negative,
but relatively small since few brand oriented consumers choose the basic good. By contrast,
the positive indirect effect that comes from the increase in the premium price is comparably
big because of the large share of brand oriented buyers that picks the high quality product.
The combined effect is therefore positive when δ is sufficiently high. A similar logic applies
when the difference in quality is sufficiently low, meaning that the majority of brand oriented
buyers opts for the basic good (i.e., ŷ∗i =
p∗ih−p∗i`
δ is relatively high). In that case, profits are
decreasing in c` and increasing in ch.
In sum, firms benefit from a cost decrease in their most popular submarket. Perhaps
surprisingly, however, they also benefit from a cost increase in their least popular quality
segment.
4 Centralized versus Decentralized Pricing
In the previous section, we analyzed strategic pricing under the assumption that pricing de-
cisions are taken at the firm level. In practice, however, the production of different quality
types is frequently organized in separate divisions that themselves determine what price to
charge. For such decentralized organisational structures with corresponding incentive mech-
anisms it is more natural to assume that pricing decisions take place at the product type
level. In particular, when division managers have discretion to determine their own prices
and bonuses are primarily based on division rather than on company performance, divisions
may effectively operate as distinct firms. In this section, we explore how such decentralized
pricing affects prices, profits and welfare in comparison to the centralized pricing model of
the preceding section.
The next result is comparable to Proposition 1 and shows that there is again a unique
(and symmetric) Nash equilibrium when prices are set at the product type level. Akin to the
centralized pricing case, all qualities are sold to both brand and quality oriented buyers and
the equilibrium price of the premium product is higher.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1 and δ ≥ max{τ`, τh}, there is a unique Nash equilib-
8
rium. In this equilibrium, firms set prices symmetrically at:
p◦` = c` +
(2τhµ+δµh)(δµ`+2µ(ch−c`))+2δτhµ(µ`+µh+2µ)
(4τ`µ+δµ`)(4τhµ+δµh)−4τ`τhµ2 τ`
and
p◦h = ch +
(2τ`µ+δµ`)(δµh+2µ[δ−(ch−c`)])+2δτ`µ(µ`+µh+2µ)
(4τ`µ+δµ`)(4τhµ+δµh)−4τ`τhµ2 τh.
Furthermore, 0 < p◦h − p◦` < δ.
To avoid humongous expressions, but without renouncing any factor crucial to the under-
standing of the mechanic forces when comparing decentralized pricing relative to centralized
pricing within the context of the vertizontal differentiated market, we restrict our parameters
to µh = µ` = µ = 1 and τh = τ` and assume δ ≥ max{τ`, τh} (such that ŷ◦ ∈ (0, 1)). Doing
so, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 7. Prices and profits are lower under decentralized pricing. Moreover, the
demand for low quality is larger if and only if δ > 2(ch − c`).
This proposition implies that producer surplus, defined as the sum of profits, is lower. That
consumers surplus is higher with decentralized pricing follows from the decrease in prices.
Consumers who do not switch product type benefit from the price decrease, whereas those
who do switch benefit even more. What happens to overall welfare thus depends on which of
these two effects dominates.
To determine the net effect, note that price changes only cause a redistribution of welfare
in case of non-switching customers. Any change in total surplus consequently comes from
those who switch product type.
Proposition 7 tells us that if δ > 2(ch − c`) (alternatively, δ < 2(ch − c`)), then for
each brand there is an interval Y of brand oriented buyers who switch to the low (high)
quality product. These switching consumers y ∈ Y create a welfare gain (loss) by a reduction
(increase) in ch − c` and a welfare loss (gain) of δy. Aggregating these differences over all
switching consumers,
2
∫
Y
δy − (ch − c`) dy,
gives the overall welfare gain (loss), which leads to the following conclusion.
Proposition 8. Decentralized pricing unambiguously yields a welfare loss.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider strategic pricing by sellers who supply multiple quality-variants of
their product and compete in the corresponding quality-segments simultaneously. Specifically,
we analyzed a duopoly model of vertizontal product differentiation in which firms offer a
basic and a premium good. Under the assumption that demand comprises both brand and
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quality oriented buyers, we established the existence of a unique (and symmetric) Nash pricing
equilibrium. These equilibrium prices are increasing in the degree of brand differentiation as
well as in the number of brand oriented buyers. Moreover, equilibrium profits may increase
in production costs and the equilibrium price of the basic (premium) product is decreasing
(increasing) in the quality difference.
We contrasted these findings with the possibility that pricing decisions are taken decen-
trally; at the product (division) level. We prove there is again a unique (and symmetric)
Nash equilibrium in which both prices and profits are lower than in the centralized case. We
furthermore find that demand for the basic product is higher when the quality difference is
sufficiently large and show that welfare is unambiguously lower with decentralized pricing.
There are several natural avenues for future research. One is to extend the dimensions
of the model (e.g., number of firms or quality segments). This, however, is likely to prove
challenging in terms of deriving explicit and meaningful expressions. Another is to use this
framework to analyze competition among multi-product and single-product, niche, firms.
Finally, one may consider the possibility of price coordination and collusion in case products
are vertizontally differentiated.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The first-order conditions for the two simultaneous maximization
problems yield the following system of linear equations:
4τ`µ+ 2δµ` −4τ`µ −δµ` 0
−4τhµ 4τhµ+ 2δµh 0 −δµh
−δµ` 0 4τ`µ+ 2δµ` −4τ`µ
0 −δµh −4τhµ 4τhµ+ 2δµh


p1`
p1h
p2`
p2h

=

(2τ`µ+ δµ`)c` − 2τ`µch + δτ`µ`
(2τhµ+ δµh)ch − 2τhµc` + δτh(2µ+ µh)
(2τ`µ+ δµ`)c` − 2τ`µch + δτ`µ`
(2τhµ+ δµh)ch − 2τhµc` + δτh(2µ+ µh)
 .
For both firms, solutions being global maxima of their respective maximization problem is
guaranteed by the negative definite Hessians:(−(4τ`µ+ 2δµ`) 4τ`µ
4τhµ −(4τhµ+ 2δµh)
)
.
Since the matrix of coefficients in the system of linear equations is non-singular, we know
that this system has one real solution. Moreover, given that asymmetric equilibria need to
come in pairs, this solution must be symmetric. Exploiting this symmetry (that is, assuming
p1` = p2` = p` and p1h = p2h = ph), the above system reduces to(
4τ`µ+ δµ` −4τ`µ
−4τhµ 4τhµ+ δµh
)(
p`
ph
)
=
(
(2τ`µ+ δµ`)c` − 2τ`µch + δτ`µ`
(2τhµ+ δµh)ch − 2τhµc` + δτh(2µ+ µh)
)
.
Solving this system gives the solution (p∗` , p
∗
h, ) as specified in the proposition. Finally, fea-
sibility conditions for the demand being well-specified (i.e., ŷ1, ŷ2 ∈ (0, 1) at prices p∗` and
p∗h) requires p
∗
h > p
∗
` and p
∗
h − p∗` < δ. As one can easily verify, Assumption 1 is a sufficient
condition for p∗h > p
∗
` and p
∗
h − p∗` < δ.
Proof of Proposition 2. The first derivative of p∗` with respect to c` and ch is respectively
given by:
∂p∗`
∂c`
= 2µ(τ`µh+2τhµ`)+δµ`µh4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh > 0 and
∂p∗`
∂ch
= 2τ`µhµ4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh > 0,
and the first derivative of p∗h with respect to c` and ch is respectively given by:
∂p∗h
∂c`
= 2τhµ`µ4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh > 0 and
∂p∗h
∂ch
= 2µ(2τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The first derivative of p∗` with respect to τ`, τh, µ` and µh is
respectively given by:
∂p∗`
∂τ`
= (4µτhµ` + δµ`µh) · 4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh+2µ([(ch−c`)+2(τh−τ`)]µh+4τhµ)(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 > 0,
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∂p∗`
∂τh
= 4τ`µhµ · 4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh+2µ([δ−(ch−c`)−2(τh−τ`)]µ`+4τ`µ)(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 > 0,
∂p∗`
∂µ`
= −2τ`µ(4τhµ+ δµh) · [(ch−c`)+2(τh−τ`)]µh+4τhµ(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 < 0,
and
∂p∗`
∂µh
= −8τ`τhµ2 · [δ−(ch−c`−2(τh−τ`)]µ`+4τ`µ(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 < 0.
The first derivative of p∗h with respect to τ`, τh, µ` and µh is respectively given by:
∂p∗h
∂τ`
= 4τhµ`µ · 4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh+2µ([(ch−c`)+2(τh−τ`)]µh+4τhµ)(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 > 0,
∂p∗h
∂τh
= (4τ`µhµ+ δµ`µh) · 4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh+2µ([δ−(ch−c`)−2(τh−τ`)]µ`+4τ`µ)(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 > 0,
∂p∗h
∂µ`
= −8τ`τhµ2 · [(ch−c`)+2(τh−τ`)]µh+4µτh(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 < 0,
and
∂ph∗
∂µh
= −2τhµ(4τ`µ+ δµ`) · [δ−(ch−c`)−2(τh−τ`)]µ`+4τ`µ(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 < 0.
The terms in squared brackets in the numerator are positive by Assumption 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. The first derivative of p∗` with respect to µ and δ is respectively
given by:
∂p∗`
∂µ = 2τ` · δµ`µh([(ch−c`)+2(τh−τ`)]µh+8τhµ)+16τhµ
2(τ`µh+τhµ`)
(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2
> 0
and
∂p∗`
∂δ = −τ`µh · 2µ`µ([(ch−c`)+2(τh−τ`)]µh+4τhµ)(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 < 0.
The first derivative of p∗h with respect to µ and δ is respectively given by:
∂p∗h
∂µ = 2τh · δµ`µh([δ−(ch−c`)−2(τh−τ`)]µ`+8τ`µ)+16τ`µ
2(τ`µh+τhµ`)
(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2
> 0
and
∂p∗h
∂δ = τhµ` · 2µ`µ([(ch−c`)+2(τh−τ`)]µh+4τhµ)(4µ(τ`µh+τhµ`)+δµ`µh)2 < 0.
In determining the sign of these derivatives, notice that the term in squared brackets in the
numerators is positive by Assumption 2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Setting µ` = µh and τ` = τh, the first derivative of pi
∗ with
respect to c` and ch is given by:
∂pi∗
∂c`
= −∂pi∗∂ch =
4τhµ
2(δµh+4τhµ)[δ−2(ch−c`)]
δ(δµh+8τhµ)2
.
The term in the squared brackets determines the sign of the derivatives.
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Proof of Proposition 6. The first-order conditions for the four simultaneous maximization
problems yield the following system of linear equations
4τ`µ+ 2δµ` −2τ`µ −δµ` 0
−2τhµ 4τhµ+ 2δµh 0 −δµh
−δµ` 0 4τ`µ+ 2δµ` −2τ`µ
0 −δµh −2τhµ 4τhµ+ 2δµh


p1`
p1h
p2`
p2h

=

(2τ`µ+ δµ`)c` + δτ`µ`
(2τhµ+ δµh)ch + δτh(2µ+ µh)
(2τ`µ+ δµ`)c` + δτ`µ`
(2τhµ+ δµh)ch + δτh(2µ+ µh)
 .
Since the matrix of coefficients in the system of linear equations is non-singular, we know
that this system has one real solution. Moreover, given that asymmetric equilibria need to
come in pairs, this solution must be symmetric. Exploiting this symmetry (that is, assuming
p1` = p2` = p` and p1h = p2h = ph), the above system reduces to(
4τ`µ+ δµ` −2τ`µ
−2τhµ 4τhµ+ δµh
)(
p`
ph
)
=
(
(2τ`µ+ δµ`)c` + δτ`µ`
(2τhµ+ δµh)ch + δτh(2µ+ µh)
)
.
Solving this system gives the solution (p◦` , p
◦
h, ) as specified in the proposition. Finally, feasi-
bility conditions for the demand being well-specified (i.e., ŷ1, ŷ2 ∈ (0, 1) at prices p◦` and p◦h)
requires p◦h > p
◦
` and p
◦
h − p◦` < δ. It can be verified that Assumption 1 and δ ≥ max{τ`, τh}
are a sufficient condition for p◦h > p
◦
` and p
◦
h − p◦` < δ.
Proof of Proposition 7. For µh = µ` = µ = 1 and τh = τ` = τ , we have:
p∗` = c` + 2τ − [δ−2(ch−c`)]τδ+8τ p∗h = ch + 2τ + [δ−2(ch−c`)]τδ+8τ
p◦` = c` + 2
δ
δ+2τ τ − [δ−2(ch−c`)]τδ+6τ p◦h = ch + 2 δδ+2τ τ + [δ−2(ch−c`)]τδ+6τ
and
ŷ∗ = 1δ
{
(ch − c`) + 2[δ−2(ch−c`)]τδ+8τ
}
ŷ◦ = 1δ
{
(ch − c`) + 2[δ−2(ch−c`)]τδ+6τ
}
.
From this, we obtain the profits
pi∗ = 4τ + (δ+4τ)[δ−2(ch−c`)]
2τ
δ(δ+8τ)2
pi◦ = 4 δδ+2τ τ +
(δ+2τ)[δ−2(ch−c`)]2τ
δ(δ+6τ)2
.
The statement in the proposition follows from a comparison of these values.
Proof of Proposition 8. If δ > 2(ch − c`), then Y = [ŷ∗, ŷ◦] and the change in welfare is
given by
2
∫ ŷ◦
ŷ∗
(ch − c`)− δy dy = −[δ(ŷ∗ + ŷ◦)− 2(ch − c`)] · (ŷ◦ − ŷ∗).
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Alternatively, if δ < 2(ch − c`), then Y = [ŷ◦, ŷ∗] and the change in welfare is given by
2
∫ ŷ∗
ŷ◦
δy − (ch − c`) dy = [δ(ŷ∗ + ŷ◦)− 2(ch − c`)] · (ŷ∗ − ŷ◦).
Both expressions lead to
−16τ3(δ+7τ)[δ−(ch−c`)]2
δ(δ+6τ)2(δ+8τ)2
,
which is negative.
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